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 Measuring the impact of alcohol multi-buy promotions ŽŶĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ 
Hui Lu+, Stephane Hess*, Andrew Daly+ and Charlene Rohr+ 
+ RAND Europe, * University of Leeds 
The objective of this study was to understand the impact of alcohol multi-buy promotions on 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ purchasing behaviour. Our study deployed a Stated Preference survey to measure 
ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƉƌŝĐĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐĂŶĚ the introduction of promotions, as well 
as the resulting effects on demand. A series of econometric models were developed, ranging from 
simple selection models to advanced multiple discrete-continuous extreme value (MDCEV) models, 
to capture the discrete and continuous feature of alcohol purchasing choice behaviour. The model 
results were compared and then extrapolated to a series of policy scenario tests, to enable the 
evaluation of factors that underpin consumers ? ĂůĐŽŚŽůpurchasing behaviour. This research 
contributes to evidence on the role of multi-buy promotions on alcohol purchasing behaviour, as 
well as adding to recent developments in the choice modelling literature by providing a comparison 
of results across a range of different model structures suitable for the analysis of data such as used 
here. 
Keywords: alcohol consumption; discrete continuous; MDCEV 
1. Introduction 
Excessive alcohol consumption is a major cause of ill-health and mortality and is also associated with 
economic and social harm. The Department of Health in the UK has estimated that the harmful use 
of alcohol costs the National Health Service (NHS) approximately £3.5 billion per year and 7% of all 
hospital admissions were alcohol related1 in 2009 - 2010. The Government Alcohol Strategy report 
(2012)2 stated that the cost of alcohol related harm is estimated to be £21 billion annually.  
Alcohol pricing is considered by some to be a potential means of influencing levels of alcohol 
consumption (Anderson et al., 2009; Purshouse et al., 2010). However, alcohol pricing is a sensitive 
policy issue, with those in favour of price regulation arguing that it has the potential to reduce harms 
from overconsumption of alcohol, and those against emphasising the need to limit the impact on 
those who drink alcohol in moderation.  
In this study, we examine the impact of one aspect of pricing - multi-buy promotions - ŽŶĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?
purchasing of alcohol for consumption off the premises where the purchase was made. By multi-buy 
promotions, we refer specifically to promotions where there is a link between the number of 
products purchased and the price of the prŽĚƵĐƚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ‘ƚǁŽĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨŽŶĞ ? ? ‘ƚŚƌĞĞĨŽ 
ƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨƚǁŽ ?ŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞŽĨŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĞŝƚĞŵĨŽƌĂĨŝǆĞĚƉƌŝĐĞĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚ ?The study was 
carried out under considerable time pressure between September 2012 and January 2013 in order 
to inform the impacts of proposed policy to ban alcohol multi-buy promotions. 
                                                          
1 Nakamura, et. al (2014) 
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224075/alcohol-strategy.pdf 
 We contribute to the empirical literature on better understanding alcohol purchase behaviour under 
multi-buy promotion in three ways. First, we deploy a novel data collection approach to measure 
consumers ? stated alcohol purchases under different market changes which are not easily observed 
in the real market.  Second, a series of econometric techniques ranging from the Tobit and Heckman 
models to advanced MDCEV models are developed to explain the discrete  W continuous nature of 
alcohol purchasing behaviour. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first time that MDCEV 
models have been used for interpreting consumers ? alcohol purchase behaviour. Third, the results 
are then used in a series of policy scenario tests, which help to gauge the potential impact of 
removing alcohol multi-buy promotions.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the design of the 
stated preference survey and the data collection more widely. Section 3 summarises key literature 
regarding econometric models that predict discrete-continuous choices with a special emphasis on 
the comparison of these models. Section 4 discusses the estimation of the econometric models. 
Section 5 presents a series of policy scenario tests, followed by Section 6 which concludes the paper 
with the discussion of the policy implications and future work.  
2. Data Description  
2.1 Stated Preference Survey Design 
Given the limitations of available retail measurement data (lack of detail on consumers, and limited 
information on promotions), an online survey was designed to collect self-reported information on 
existing patterns of alcohol consumption and purchasing. This included a stated preference 
component to examine potential responses to alcohol promotions under different market situations, 
including multi-buy promotions. Stated choice techniques have been widely used in marketing, 
environmental science, transport demand analysis and the health sector (Louviere, et al., 2000). 
Within the survey, each respondent was presented with a number of hypothetical scenarios, with 
different alcohol prices and with/without the multi-buy promotions for six types of alcohol, and 
asked to indicate which types of alcohol they would purchase and the volumes of each they would 
purchase. 
For realism, respondents were asked to consider purchases that they made themselves (for 
themselves and their households where relevant). To avoid excessive incidence of zero expenditure, 
we asked respondents to consider their likely purchases over the following four week period. This 
was also important in the context where we wanted to explore the impact of multi-buy offers on 
purchasing, which puts an emphasis on cross-product substitution, requiring respondents to imagine 
a situation in which they were making a number of purchases (and ideally multiple purchases).  
Three types of alcohol were included in the choice scenarios: wine, beer / cider and spirits, using 
generic brands, with wine and beer quality reflected through different price ranges. Three types of 
multi-buy promotion were tested for each alcohol type, as outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1 Alcohol alternatives and promotions included in the survey 
Alcohol type Quality differentiation Promotion type 
Wine (750 ml/bottle) 1. Wine A  W (less than £5) 
2. Wine B  W (£5  W 10) 
1. 3 for a fixed price discount 
(70/80/90% of the fixed price)  
 3. Wine C  W (more than £10) 2. 3 for 2 
3. 2 for 1 
Beer  1. Beer A  W (440ml /can,  
around £1/can) 
2. Beer B  W (330ml /bottle, 
around £2/bottle) 
1. 12 for a fixed price discount 
(70/80/90% of the fixed price) 
2. 12 for 8 
3. 8 for 6 
Spirits (750ml/bottle)  1. 2 for a fixed price discount 
(70/80/90% of the fixed price) 
2. 3 for 2 
 
Although the primary aim of the research was to model the specific impact of alcohol multi-buy 
promotions on purchasing behaviour, it was also important for validation of the model to estimate 
an accurate price sensitivity. With this in mind, we included some choices with price differences only 
(and no promotions) and some choices with promotions. Respondents were therefore asked to 
participate in two sets of scenarios, with 12 choice tasks in total. The first four choice scenarios 
involved choices between non-promotion items, with alternatives varying in price only, while the 
second set of eight choice scenarios included non-promotion items and promotion items for some 
alcohol types. All choice tasks included the non-promotion versions of each of the six products 
(three types of wine, two types of beer and spirits). In the scenarios with promotions, one promotion 
on wine and one promotion on beer were included in each choice task, where these always applied 
to just one product within a category (so e.g. no joint promotions for wine A and wine B). In half of 
the scenarios, a promotion on spirits was included (with one of two types), while in the others, 
spirits were not on promotion.  
The first choice task reflected a scenario where all alcohol types were present, at baseline prices, 
with no promotions. This scenario formed the baseline for analysis of changes as a result of the 
introduction of pricing changes and promotions.  
The presentation of the choices drew on the visual presentation of two supermarket shelves. On one 
shelf were the six types of non-promotion alcohol products. Respondents were asked to indicate 
how many bottles or cans of each alcohol type they would purchase at that price. The total price for 
all choices they made was shown on the screen which is updated immediately after any adjustments 
to the choices made. Figure 1 illustrates an example choice scenario without promotions. 
Figure 1 Example choice scenario without multi-buy promotions 
 
 A second shelf containing promotion items was introduced in the second set of scenarios. Each 
promotion was described by the type of promotion, the total cost and the amount saved for each 
ŽĨĨĞƌ ? ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂƐŬĞĚ ƚŽ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ  ‘ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞ ? Figure 2 
illustrates an example choice scenario involving promotions. The order in which the shelves were 
presented, i.e. with either the promotions presented on the top shelf or the bottom shelf, was 
randomly varied between individuals.  
In addition to the stated choice tasks, respondents were asked about their level of alcohol 
consumption, as well as other general background information (age, gender, ethnicity, marital 
status, education, religion) and household information (size of household, drinking habits and 
purchasing habits of others in the household where known, household income, socio-economic 
classification). After the choice tasks, respondents were asked about their attitudes to multi-buy 
discounts, their alcohol consumption habits and preferences, and their attitude to alcohol more 
generally. For further details on the design of the survey and stated preference scenarios, see Rohr 
et al. (2013). 
Figure 2: Example choice scenario with multi-buy promotions 
 
2.2 Data collection field work and sample description  
To understand preferences by different types of drinkers, it was necessary to have observations 
across a range of alcohol consumption levels. The categorisation of consumption levels followed the 
Quantity  W Frequency approach (Goddard, 2007) adopted by the General Lifestyle survey (ONS, 
2010), defining four consumption levels: Moderate A (low moderate), Moderate B (high moderate), 
Hazardous and Harmful consumption levels. Consumption levels are determined by self-reported 
average weekly alcohol consumption. 
300 respondents were targeted for each alcohol consumption level, leading to a two-stage 
recruitment methodology, whereby a screener survey was undertaken with a large online panel of 
respondents representing the age, gender, socio-economic group and regional distributions of the 
national population to identify potential respondents in each consumption segment. Respondents 
 were then drawn from each consumption segment to participate in the main survey. The main 
survey was undertaken between 22 November and 4 December 2012. 1,265 completed surveys 
were obtained, reflecting an overall response rate of 47.7 percent, after which data cleaning 
removed 42 individuals (3.3% of the whole sample).  
2.3 Preliminary data analysis 
Prior to the choice scenarios, individuals were asked to report the amount that they had spent on 
alcohol purchases off-trade (i.e. in supermarkets, at off-licences, abroad and through internet and 
other locations). This information is used to assess their consumption levels and as reliability check 
of their stated expenditure in the choice tasks. At an aggregate level, the comparison in Table 2 
shows that the stated expenditure levels in the choice tasks are very similar to the reported 
expenditure in the supermarkets (albeit with a higher standard deviation), but are lower than the 
total spending in all locations. Moreover, it shows that the expenditure increases with the level of 
drinking which is within expectation.    
Table 2 Comparison of average spending on alcohol products in the previous four weeks compared to the 
stated expenditure levels in the Stated Preference scenarios 
Segment Average reported 
spend in previous four 
weeks in 
supermarkets 
Average reported spend in 
previous four weeks in 
supermarkets, off-licences, 
abroad, internet and other 
locations 
Average stated 
expenditure in choice 
tasks 
 Mean (£) SD (£) Mean (£) SD (£) Mean (£) SD (£) 
Consumption segment 
     
Moderate A 13.17 18.17 16.14 22.23 14.51 26.39 
Moderate B 25.49 25.16 38.82 45.65 22.83 32.64 
Hazardous 45.28 46.23 65.56 78.70 43.37 83.27 
Harmful 68.70 80.77 102.10 149.83 67.47 114.93 
Gender 
      
Male 37.81 50.78 54.83 74.71 38.36 91.72 
Female 38.03 55.96 55.52 109.85 35.46 58.47 
Age 
      
18±24 24.04 45.29 43.72 161.67 27.61 62.82 
25±34 36.90 72.23 57.34 97.82 37.29 66.99 
35±44 44.53 40.34 60.41 75.56 41.89 105.84 
45±54 49.94 66.36 67.00 95.01 42.71 65.53 
55±64 49.94 48.84 57.09 70.22 40.76 72.09 
65plus 31.91 36.63 47.10 57.41 31.55 76.94 
Socio-economic group 
     
ABC1 41.78 59.48 62.72 113.30 40.85 91.39 
C2DE 33.53 45.22 46.59 64.35 32.42 55.67 
All 37.92 53.44 55.17 93.97 36.90 76.89 
* Measures of socio-economic group were collected as screening questions. ABC1 refers to those employed in managerial, 
professional, administrative, supervisory or clerical roles, or students; C2DE refers to those performing unskilled, semi-skilled or 
skilled manual work or those not in permanent employment. 
In terms of purchasing patterns from the data, we see that people purchased multiple types of 
alcohol products, specifically in 10.7% of the choice tasks respondents buy either two or three 
different types of wine, and in 8.9% of tasks, they buy both types of beer. These rates vary across 
our four segments, and, for harmful drinkers, the rates are 15.9% and 13.1%, respectively. Out of 
those tasks where respondents buy any wine (73% of tasks), respondents buy two or three types in 
14.7% of those tasks, where for beer, the corresponding rate is 16.6% (of the 53.8% of tasks where 
respondents buy any beer). This clearly shows that respondents buy multiple products from the 
same overall alcohol family at the same time. Overall, respondents buy at least one product in 76.8% 
 of tasks, and in 41.6% of tasks (i.e. more than half of those where a purchase is made), they buy 
more than one product. 
The situation of course becomes slightly more complex in the presence of promotions. If there is a 
promotion, say on wine A, then the a priori expectation might be that a consumer should buy all 
his/her wine A products under the promotion. That argument would of course apply in the case of a 
promotion where you can buy a single bottle at a reduced price. A respondent would then buy all 
his/her bottles at that price. However, such a promotion type was not included in our survey, which 
was specifically concerned with multi-buy promotions. Let us then consider for example the case 
where, for wine A, there is a promotion where you can buy 3 bottles and receive a 20% discount on 
the price of each bottle. A respondent might however for example want to buy 4 bottles, and would 
then buy one bottle at full price, and the remaining 3 with the 20% discount. In fact, the only case 
where the presence of a promotion should in theory rule out a respondent also buying the product 
at full price is the 2 for 1 promotion on wine. 
Our data also supports the notion that respondents do indeed combine full price and promotion 
purchases for the same product. In 4.8% of choice tasks that involve promotion items, the 
respondent is observed to buy bottles of the same product both at full price and at the promotion 
price. This varies across product types and quality. For wine, this occurs for 5.4% in the case of wine 
A (i.e. the lowest price category), and drops to 0.6% for wine C (i.e. the highest price category). For 
beer, we see a similar pattern (3.2% for beer A and 1.5% for beer B). This is in line with expectations 
and the notion that premium products might be less for immediate consumption than lower price 
ones. 
For just over a third of those cases (i.e. of the 4.8%), we see respondents buying enough bottles at 
full price for them to have saved money by instead buying some of those bottles at the discount 
price. Two possible interpretations arise here. Firstly, respondents may of course make mistakes (as 
shoppers clearly do at times) by not completely understanding the promotion or misjudging the 
savings they would get by shifting some of their full price items to promotion items. Secondly, there 
is the possibility that some respondents assumed that the promotion items may not be of the same 
quality as the full price items for wine category A  W this is realistic as we did not explicitly say what 
vintage or winemaker a given bottle related to. 
3. Econometric models 
The stated preference scenarios collected respondents ? choices of both the type of alcohol they 
would purchase (a discrete choice) and the amount that they would purchase (a continuous value). 
When zero purchases are present, standard econometric models using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
based on all the positive observations would generate biased parameter estimates (Amemiya, 1984). 
In addition, excluding zero observations would cause a loss of efficiency.  
3.1. Tobit models 
Previous work in this area has largely been based on the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958), often referred to 
as a censored regression model, and widely used to estimate demand relationships with limited 
dependent variables, especially with the context in which quantity lies in a specific range, often that 
 is non-negative. A rich literature documents the overview and application of Tobit models 
(Amemiya, 1984; Breen, 1996; Long, 1997).  
The Tobit model expresses the behaviour of the observed dependent variable ݕ௜, in terms of an 
underlying (non-observed) latent variable, ݕ௜כ given by  ୧כ ൌ  ୧Ⱦ ൅ ɂ୧, where ɂ୧ሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻ                   [1] ௜ܺ  is a vector of independent variables and ߚ is a vector of the coefficients to be estimated. The 
latent variable ݕ௜כ has a normal homoskedastic distribution with linear conditional mean, and ݕ௜  has 
a continuous distribution with a threshold, so that below the threshold, ݕ௜  is either, in one version of 
the Tobit model, not observed at all (truncated model) or, in the alternative version which is 
applicable here, set to some arbitrary value (censored model).  When the data is censored at 0, the 
observed dependent variable is  ݕ௜ ൌ  ݕ௜כ  if ݕ௜כ ൐  ?          [2] ݕ௜ ൌ  ?   if  ݕ௜כ ൑  ?          [3] 
The Tobit model is restrictive because it assumes that the same set of variables, with the same 
coefficients, determine both the probability of a non-zero purchase and the volume of alcohol 
purchased. Several empirical evidence have emphasised the importance of a generalisation beyond 
the Tobit model in the analysis of alcohol consumption (Blaylock and Blisard, 1993; Yen and Jensen, 
1996), hypothesising that participation and consumption processes stem from two separate 
individual choices. In addition, the Tobit model is restricted to binary choice, whereas we are 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĂůĐŽŚŽůƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞŽĨŵƵůƚŝƉůĞƉƌŽducts under multiple promotions.  
3.2. Heckman models 
The Heckman model (Heckman, 1976, 1979) is more general for the analysis of self-selected data, 
and is formed by a probit model for participation and an OLS model for consumption.  
The first part of the model predicts participation as a function of the sign of z   ൌ ୧N?ȾN?൅ ɂN?, where ɂN?is normally distributed ሺ ?ǡ  ?ሻ                                                            [4] 
which is a binary probit model; the consumption Equation [1] applies when  is positive. The data 
vectors ܺ and ܺN? may overlap, and particularly ɂ and ɂN?may be correlated, but the pair of models 
give more scope for accurate specification than the simpler Tobit specification.  
Heckman (Heckman, 1979) sets out a consistent estimation procedure for models of this form. This 
consists of estimating the probit model in the usual way, but then adding an additional term to the 
linear regression: 
 ୧כ ൌ  ୧Ⱦ ൅ ɏɐɉ ൅ ɂ୧, where ɂ୧ is normally distributed                                         [5] 
where ߪ is the standard deviation of ߝ,  ߩ denotes the correlation between ߝ and ߝN?, and ߣ is the 
inverse Mills ratio: 
 ߣ ൌ  ׎ሺ೉N?ഁN?഑N?ሻ஍ሺ೉N?ഁN?഑N?ሻ                      [6] 
where  ɐN? is the standard deviation of ɂN? and ߶ and Ȱ are respectively the frequency and cumulative 
functions of the standard Normal distribution. The coefficient (ߩߪሻ is estimated in the regression 
model along with ߚ. The term ሺߩߪߣሻ is simply the expected value of ሺܻ െ ܺߚሻ when z is known to be 
positive. Thus, with this correction, the expectation of ߝ in Equation [5] is zero.  
The likelihood function for the Heckman model is: 
ܮ ൌ   ? ሾ ? െ ʣሺ ௜ܺN?ߚN?ሻሿ  ? ʣሾ൬௑೔N?ఉN?ାഐ഑ሺ௬ି௑೔ఉሻ൰ඥଵିఘమ ሿା଴ ଵఙ ׎ ቂ௬ି௑೔ఉఙ ቃ                                                  [7] 
Heckman demonstrates that this is a generalisation of the Tobit model and that the estimator is 
consistent. The probability that consumers will be purchasers of a specific type of alcohol is 
predicted by a binary model, then for those who decided to purchase, the volume purchased is 
predicted by a linear model. This is different from the Tobit model in which the same function is 
used to predict both the decision to purchase and the quantity purchased. Indeed, in the Heckman 
model, it is necessary that the functions be different to allow full statistical identification of the 
model (Puhari, 2000).  
3.3. Limitations of Tobit and Heckman models 
The main issues regarding Tobit models, such as the restriction to binary choices and the consequent 
limitation on the treatment of promotions, also apply to Heckman models. Furthermore, despite 
Heckman models offering greater freedom in modelling behaviour, they also present a specific 
problem in forecasting in that it is not guaranteed that the linear model [1] will give a positive 
outcome (Daly, 2013). While Tobit and Heckman models correct conventional regressions by 
incorporating the fact that purchases must be zero or positive (i.e. not negative), they represent 
substitution and competition between products only at an aggregate level. That is, in our case, the 
choice by respondents for a particular alcohol type can be represented in these models by the price 
and promotions of other types, but does not take account of the specific choices of the individual 
over several alcohol types. Finally, the models do noƚŐŝǀĞĂŶǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƐĂƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ƚŚĂƚ
the additional benefit gained per unit purchased may decline as the amount purchased increase, and 
also omit any consideration that the total amount spent may restrict the spending behaviour of 
consumers. 
To overcome the limitations of Tobin and Heckman models, a series of recent studies provide more 
advanced models in both microeconomic and econometric aspects (Dubin and McFadden, 1984; 
Train, 1986; De Jong 1991; Bolduc, 2001). Accent and RAND Europe (2002) provide a thorough 
review of these models. The advantages of these models are reflected in that they not only bring the 
model within the bounds of economic theory, but contain the possibility of introducing a more 
complex choice model framework than the binary probit models used in the earlier work. Through a 
good formulation of the demand function in the regression model, for instance including the exact 
cost term, the models are more consistent with economic theory (accounting for satiation and 
diminishing marginal utility by introducing curvature in the utility function). The application of strict 
economic theory indicates how the choice and purchase models relate and may suggest suitable 
forms for testing.  
 In both Dubin and McFadden ?Ɛ and in Train ?Ɛ work, the choice and usage models are estimated 
sequentially and there is therefore no mechanism by which consistency between the indirect utility 
and the purchase equation can be maintained. De Jong ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚĂŬĞƐ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚwhich 
allows simultaneous estimation, but this leads to quite complicated functions, which would be even 
more complicated in the present study where multiple alternatives are considered, and, as pointed 
out by Bolduc et al. (2001), this can lead to the propagation of specification error from one model to 
the other.  
3.4. Family of multiple discrete-continuous extreme value models 
The MDCEV model (Bhat, 2005, 2008) goes further in representing competition between products at 
the disaggregate level. Consumers are modelled as making a simultaneous choice of a number of 
different products and, for each of product chosen, how many units to purchase. They are assumed 
to maximise a direct utility function ሺܠሻ, where ܠ is a vector of non-negative quantities of 
consumption for each of the goods, such that ܠ ൌ ሺଵǡ ǥ ǡ ௄ሻ. The consumption activities of a 
consumer are subject to a budget constraint, such that the consumer maximises U(x) subject to ܠܘ ൌ , where  is the budget, and where ܘ is the vector of prices for the different goods. In most 
applications, ܠ includes an outside good to represent expenditure on all other items, say good 
number 1, which is assumed to have unit price (so that ଵ ൌ  ?). The chief advantages of this 
framework in the context of the present study are that it is better able to capture the substitution 
effects between the different products through the operation of the budget constraint and that a 
satiation effect can be modelled for each product. 
At the heart of the model used in the present application is a non-linear utility form that allows the 
marginal utility, i.e. the additional benefit of an additional unit purchased, of each additional unit of 
a given good to decrease with increasing consumption of that good. Using the formulation 
introduced by Bhat and Pinjari (2013), with good 1 being the outside good (of K goods), we have 
that:  
  ܷሺݔሻ ൌ ଵఈభ ߰ଵݔଵఈభ ൅  ? ఊೖఈೖ ߰௞ ቀቀ௫ೖఊೖ ൅  ?ቁఈೖ െ  ?ቁ௄௞ୀଶ      [8] 
This model relies on three distinct parameters for each good, namely ߰௞, ߛ௞, and ߙ௞. The specific 
role of these parameters is as follows. 
- ߰௞ is the marginal utility of good k at the point of zero consumption, also referred to as the 
baseline marginal utility. A higher baseline utility makes non-zero consumption of a good 
more likely. The baseline utility is parametrised by interactions between estimated 
parameters and (non-price) attributes of the good and characteristics of the decision maker. 
To ensure positive baseline marginal utilities, we define ߰ሺݖ௞ሻ ൌ ݁ఉN?௭ೖ. With the addition of 
a multiplicative random element, we obtain ߰ሺݖ௞ ǡ ߝ௞ሻ ൌ ݁ఉN?௭ೖାఌೖ, where ߝ௞ is an extreme-
value error term, and where ݖ௞ contains the attributes of product k and those of the 
consumer, while ߚ  is an estimated vector of parameters, including a product-specific 
constant, and where, for normalisation, we set the deterministic part of the log baseline 
utility for one good to zero, say the outside good. 
- The key role of ߛ௞ is to allow for zero consumption for good , i.e. it is a translation 
parameter, although Bhat and Pinjari (2013) also suggest a role for ߛ௞  as a satiation 
parameter. There is no translation parameter for the outside good (as it is always 
consumed), and we have a constraint that ߛ௞ ൐  ? for  ൐  ?. 
 - ߙ௞ has a more explicit role as a satiation parameter as it reduces the marginal utility of good 
k with increasing consumption, where lower ߙ௞ means faster satiation, and where ߙ௞ ൒  ?, 
and where it can be assumed that ߙ௞ ൑  ? as values larger than 1 would imply increasing 
utility with increasing consumption, i.e. no satiation.  
As outlined by Bhat and Pinjari (2013), joint estimation of ߙ௞ and ߛ௞ is numerically problematic due 
to the similar (satiation) roles that the parameters have, and some normalisation is generally 
required. In the present application, we have made use of the alpha-gamma profile (cf. Bhat and 
Pinjari, 2013), which sets ߙ௞ ൌ ߙଵǡ ׊݇ ൒  ?, i.e. using a generic ߙ parameter and estimating ߛ௞ ǡ ݇ ൐ ?. A key advantage of this profile is the availability of the forecasting procedure outlined in Pinjari 
and Bhat (2011), which is too complex to be reproduced here in detail.  
The probability of a given consumption vector ሺݔଵכǡ ݔଶכǡ ǥ ǡ ݔெכ ǡ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ?ሻ, where M of the K goods are 
consumed, is given by:  
ܲሺݔଵכǡ ݔଶכǡ ǥ ǡ ݔெכ ǡ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ?ሻ ൌ ଵ௣భ ଵఙಾషభ ሺ ? ௠݂ெ௠ୀଵ ሻ ቀ ? ௣೘௙೘ெ௠ୀଵ ቁ ቌ  ? ௘ೇ೔ ഑ൗಾ೘సభ൬ ? ௘ೇೖ ഑ൗೖ಼సభ ൰ಾቍ ሺܯ െ  ?ሻǨ  [9] 
where ߪ is an estimated scale parameter and where ௠݂ ൌ ቀ ଵିఈ೘௫೘כ ାఊ೘ቁ. 
The MDCEV model explicitly reflects that an individual can choose several of the specific products, 
i.e. offers of wine, beer or spirits in our case. Thus this model can better represent how the 
introduction of promotions impacts on the purchasing of other alcohol products and total alcohol 
purchases. Moreover, the MDCEV framework uses all the available information to estimate the 
choice of different types of alcohol type simultaneously, so that the statistical inefficiencies of 
separate estimation, e.g. in Tobit or Heckman models, are avoided. Furthermore, the MDCEV models 
are able to represent better the particular choice of purchasing products on promotion, which are 
represented as separate choice alternatives in the model, i.e. they can have alternative-specific 
effects reflecting the impact of the promotion. This is not possible in the Tobit or Heckman models.  
For this study we tested multinomial model structures only, where all products (whether they are 
the same type of alcohol or not, and whether they are promotion items or not) are represented as 
separate alternatives, equally competitive with each other. A key property of multinomial models is 
that the unexplained model error across alternatives in the model is independently and identically 
distributed (IID). This is a clearly a simplification, when in reality, complex correlation patterns may 
be at play. Recent developments in the literature have developed the model structure further, 
introducing correlations between alternatives, either through an underlying GEV-style nesting 
structure or through a probit-style model, leading to the MDCNEV (Pinjari and Bhat, 2010) and 
MDCGEV (Pinjari, 2011) or the MDC-probit models (cf. Bhat et al., 2013). The use of these models 
was not possible in the present study given the time constraints, but remains an important avenue 
for future work. 
Another recent development is the MDCEV-MNL variant of the model (see Bhat et al., 2009 or Eluru 
et al., 2010), a model that in essence makes some of the products mutually exclusive. This approach 
is however not suitable for our data, given the earlier discussion about respondents buying multiple 
products within the same category (e.g. wine) as well as combining full price and promotion 
purchases for the same product. 
 4. Model Estimation  
In all the models, the dependent variable was the volume of alcohol purchased, reflected by the 
number of units, using average alcohol by volume (ABV) conversions (as in the methodology 
employed for the General Lifestyle Survey). This follows on from initial tests using expenditure as the 
dependent variable, which yielded worse fit to the data, as did a log formulation of the explanatory 
variables.  We found that the pattern of model estimations from Moderate A and Moderate B 
alcohol consumption levels were not significantly different from each other and nor were the 
Hazardous and Harmful segments. Therefore, the two pairs of groups were combined in the models.  
The impact of a promotion is reflected by both the price reduction (modelled through a price 
ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇ ƚĞƌŵ ?ĂŶĚĂ  “ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ? ŝŵƉact of the promotion (measured by constants detecting 
the impact of the different promotion types). Therefore, in predicting demand for a specific alcohol 
type, the model incorporates the price and promotion characteristics of the specific alcohol type as 
well as the price and promotion characteristics of competitor products (referred to as cross-price 
and cross-promotion terms).  
Because Tobit and Heckman models are restricted to reflecting binary choices, for these models we 
adopt a similar approach to that used by Collis et al. (2010), whereby purchasing behaviour for a 
specific type of alcohol is modelled separately. A general representation of competition is reflected 
by including prices and promotions on other alcohol types. Furthermore, the Tobit and Heckman 
models do not explicitly predict the likelihood of choosing multi-buy promotions; rather they predict 
the impact of multi-buy promotions at an aggregate level. This poses some issues when estimating 
the impact of promotions on monetary expenditure as we cannot disentangle alcohol purchases 
under non-promotion prices from purchases under promotion prices.  
In the interest of space, we focus on the preferred Heckman and MDCEV models in the current 
paper. The development and results of the Tobit models are available in Rohr et al. (2013), although 
we include the forecasts from these models later on in the paper.  
The models also seek to identify variation in purchase behaviour of consumers by their socio-
demographic and economic characteristics, where they are significant, with further details of the 
variables tested in Table 3.  
Table 3 Explanatory variables tested in the model development 
Price and promotion variables Socio-demographic / economic variables 
own price (per unit) Age 
competitor prices (per unit) Gender 
own category promotions, if promotion Region 
own price, if promotion (per unit) household income 
amount saved, if promotion (per unit) socio-economic classification 
competition promotions, if promotions Religion 
competition prices, if promotions (per unit) education level 
competition amount saved, if promotions (per unit) marital status 
promotion shelf location (top or bottom) Ethnicity 
 number of adults/children in the household 
 share of the household purchases that the individual makes 
4.1 Heckman Models 
In this study, the Heckman model was estimated using a maximum likelihood approach to obtain 
simultaneous estimation of the choice and consumption models, ensuring efficient estimates. Given 
 the very large number of parameters (running to 6 pages), the full estimation results are shown in 
the report which is available online (Rohr et al., 2013), and we instead focus on a summary of the 
results showing signs and significance levels, where estimations are split by moderate (mod.) and 
hazardous and harmful (h&h) consumption, with Table 4 looking at the selection model, and Table 5 
at the regression model. The convention used is that +++ refers to a positive estimate significant at 
the 99% level, with ++ used for the 95% level and + for the 90% level, and a corresponding notation 
for negative estimates. 
Table 4: Summary results for Heckman selection model 
 
wine A wine B wine C beer A beer B spirits 
 
mod. h&h mod. h&h mod. h&h mod. h&h mod. h&h mod. h&h 
Heckman correction term +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ + +++ +++ +++ 
 
+++ +++ 
Constant --- +++ 
  
--- --- 
 
+++ --- --- -- 
 Own price -- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Own promotion 1 + ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ +++ +++ 
Own promotion 2 +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Own promotion 3 +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
  Cross effect price beer B 
      
+++ 
     Cross effect price of wine B +++ +++ 
          Cross effect promotion 1 beer A 
        
--- --- --- --- 
Cross effect promotion 1 beer B 
      
--- --- 
  
--- --- 
Cross effect promotion 1 spirits 
        
-- -- 
  Cross effect promotion 1 wine A 
  
--- --- 
        Cross effect promotion 1 wine B --- --- 
  
--- --- 
      Cross effect promotion 1 wine C --- --- --- --- 
        Cross effect promotion 2 beer A 
        
--- --- --- --- 
Cross effect promotion 2 beer B 
      
--- --- 
  
--- --- 
Cross effect promotion 2 spirits 
  
+ 
     
- 
   Cross effect promotion 2 wine A 
  
--- --- 
        Cross effect promotion 2 wine B --- --- 
   
--- 
      Cross effect promotion 2 wine C --- --- --- --- 
        Cross effect promotion 3 beer A 
        
--- --- --- --- 
Cross effect promotion 3 beer B 
      
--- --- 
  
--- --- 
Cross effect promotion 3 wine A 
  
--- --- 
        Cross effect promotion 3 wine B --- --- 
   
- 
      Cross effect promotion 3 wine C --- --- --- --- 
        Female +++ +++ +++ +++ 
 
-- --- --- --- +++ +++ +++ 
Age 18 - 24 (base 25-44) 
 
--- --- 
    
++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Age 45 - 54 (base 25-44) 
      
--- -- 
    Age 55 - 64 (base 25-44) +++ ++ 
  
+++ 
 
--- --- - 
 
+ 
 Age 65 + (base 25-44) ++ 
   
++ --- --- --- --- 
 
+ +++ 
Age above 45 (base 25-44) 
         
--- 
  Household income £20-40k p.a. (base < £20k) +++ 
 
+++ +++ +++ +++ 
  
+++ +++ 
 
+++ 
Household income £40-60k p.a. (base < £20k) 
  
+++ +++ 
 
+++ 
  
++ +++ --- ++ 
Household income >£60k p.a. (base < £20k) - --- +++ +++ +++ +++ 
 
--- +++ +++ 
  Household income not known (base < £20k) 
  
+++ +++ +++ 
  
--- 
    Low Skilled -- 
 
--- --- --- --- --- 
   
+++ 
 
 East (base London & South East) 
  
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
  
- 
  North (base London & South East) --- +++ --- 
     
+++ --- 
 
+++ 
Scotland (base London & South East) --- 
   
+++ --- 
 
--- +++ 
 
+++ +++ 
West (base London & South East) --- 
 
--- 
 
--- --- 
  
+++ 
 
- ++ 
2 or more adults in household --- 
 
--- --- --- 
 
+++ 
  
++ 
  GCSE or less (base A levels) 
  
--- 
  
--- 
 
+++ --- 
 
++ 
 No high education (base A levels) 
   
--- +++ 
  
++ --- 
  
- 
Other Education (base A levels) 
  
-- 
    
+++ +++ +++ + 
 Further education (base A levels) 
 
+++ + 
 
+++ +++ --- +++ -- +++ +++ 
 Respondent's share of alcohol buying for household +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
 
++ +++ +++ ++ +++ +++ 
Asian or Asian British (base White) 
  
- 
 
- 
  
--- 
    Black or Black British (base White) 
 
--- +++ 
 
+++ 
   
+++ 
   Mixed race (base White) 
  
--- 
    
--- --- 
   Promotions on upper shelf +++ --- +++ 
 
++ 
 
+++ 
 
+ --- -- --- 
Household with children +++ 
 
-- 
 
++ 
  
++ 
    Student 
   
- 
    
++ --- -- 
 Unemployed 
 
+++ 
     
++ -- 
    
Table 5: Summary of results for Heckman regression model 
 
wine A wine B wine C beer A beer B spirits 
 
mod. h&h mod. h&h mod. h&h mod. h&h mod. h&h mod. h&h 
Constant +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ 
  
+++ ++ 
 
+++ +++ 
Own price 
  
-- -- 
 
-- 
     
-- 
Own promotion 1 +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Own promotion 2 +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Own promotion 3 +++ +++ +++ +++ + +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
  Female 
   
+ --- 
 
--- --- ++ 
   Age 18 - 24 (base 25-44) 
 
--- 
  
++ 
      
+++ 
Age 45 - 54 (base 25-44) 
 
+++ +++ +++ 
    
- 
 
+++ 
 Age 55 - 64 (base 25-44) 
 
+++ ++ +++ ++ 
  
++ 
    Age 65 + (base 25-44) 
 
+++ 
     
+++ +++ 
 
+++ +++ 
Age above 45 (base 25-44) +++ 
           Household income £20-40k p.a. (base < £20k) ++ -- 
  
+++ 
      
++ 
Household income £20-60k p.a.  (base < £20k) 
  
+ 
     
+++ 
   Household income £40-60k p.a. (base < £20k) +++ +++ 
 
+++ + 
 
--- 
    
+++ 
Household income >£40k p.a. (base < £20k) 
     
+++ 
      Household income >£60k p.a. (base < £20k) +++ 
 
+++ 
   
++ 
     Household income not known (base < £20k) 
  
++ - 
        Low Skilled - -- 
 
- ++ - 
  
-- 
  
- 
East (base London & South East) 
   
+++ 
  
-- --- 
   
--- 
North (base London & South East) 
  
+++ 
    
--- +++ -- 
  Scotland (base London & South East) 
  
++ 
  
--- -- 
  
--- + 
 West (base London & South East) --- +++ 
         
--- 
2 or more adults in household --- --- --- 
 
--- 
  
+++ 
 
+++ 
 
+++ 
GCSE or less (base A levels) 
    
++ 
      
++ 
No high education (base A levels) 
 
-- 
    
+++ -- -- +++ 
  
 Other Education (base A levels) 
 
--- 
    
-- 
    
+++ 
Further education (base A levels) 
    
+ +++ 
 
- - 
  
++ 
Respondent's share of alcohol buying for household +++ +++ 
 
+ 
  
+++ 
  
-- 
  Asian or Asian British (base White) 
  
- 
       
--- 
 Black or Black British (base White) 
 
++ ++ +++ 
    
-- 
 
-- 
 Mixed race (base White) 
          
--- 
 Promotions on upper shelf +++ ++ 
 
++ 
      
++ 
 Student 
          
+++ 
 Unemployed 
 
-- 
        
++ 
  
The level of detail of the models is again too high to discuss every single estimate. We see that price 
and promotions have significant impacts on the selection model (decision to purchase), but matter 
less in the quantity model. Cross price and cross promotions have significant impacts on the decision 
to buy alcohol, but are hardly significant in the quantity model.  
The differential income effects for selection and the quantity models for Wine A purchasing illustrate 
the strength of the incorporation of different behavioural formulations. Here we observe that 
respondents from higher incomes are less likely to purchase cheap Wine A products, but for those 
who do make the decision to purchase these products, higher income levels are associated with 
higher levels of purchasing. Generally, we were able to identify more socio-economic variation in 
the selection (purchasing) model, particularly incorporating significant ethnicity terms, which were 
not able to be identified in the Tobit models, where the terms are constrained to be the same to 
explain both purchasing and quantity purchased. In the majority of the Heckman models, the 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƐŚĂƌĞ ŽĨ ĂůĐŽŚŽů ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ǁĂƐ positively linked with alcohol 
purchasing. The region terms had varying impacts across the models, which was not surprising given 
the small sample sizes. The term testing the impact of the shelf ordering in the choice scenarios was 
significant for some of the alcohol products, for some of the segments, but the sign was inconsistent 
across these and thus we concluded that shelf order should not be included. 
4.2 MDCEV models 
In the specification of the MDCEV model for the present application, we made use of 24 products, 
where product 1 is the outside good, goods 2 to 4 are the three types of wine (as full price items), 
goods 5 and 6 are the two types of beer (as full price items) and good 7 is spirits (as full price item). 
These are then followed by the different promotion items, where different types of promotion for a 
given good are treated as separate products, so that we have three promotion items for each wine 
and beer type, with two promotion products for spirits. The treatment of promotions as separate 
goods allows both their different marginal price and their specific attraction as promotions to be 
modelled. However, in any single presentation, at most one promotion for each alcohol type was 
shown, so that respondents could choose several from 6 to 9 offers (with a minimum of 8 in the 
promotion scenarios). The MDCEV structure implicitly includes the own and competitor prices and 
promotions within the structure, as the model incorporates competition between all alcohol types 
directly and simultaneously. 
As described above, the MDCEV model framework assumes the presence of a budget constraint. The 
assumptions made in relation to money budgets are one of the most challenging aspects of working 
with MDCEV models in our experience. Typically, this has been treated either as a time budget 
 (Bernardo et al. 2015, Bhat 2005, Sener and Bhat 2012), a money budget (Yu et al. 2011, Yu & Zhang 
2015) or even separate time and money budgets (Castro et al. 2012). Authors are increasingly 
recognising the difficulty with the definition of money budgets, where a simple hard constraint such 
as 24 hours a day for a time budget does not apply. Indeed, individuals may for example have 
different mental accounts for different products. The situation is further complicated in the case of 
work using stated preference data (such as here) where arguments can be made that the 
expenditure observed for a given respondent may well be below their budget constraint (if the 
scenarios presented were not varied enough) or may be above the real world budget constraint (by 
being based on hypothetical choices). Recent work by Augustin et al. (2015), has put forward the 
idea of using regression approaches to estimate a latent budget for vehicle miles travelled, while 
Dumont et al. (2013) proposed a latent budget approach for money budgets. 
For the budget assumption, a number of different specifications were tested. The most meaningful 
results were obtained by assuming that the budget for a given consumer was the maximum 
expenditure observed for that consumer across any of the twelve choice tasks, plus £1, ensuring that 
in each task, at least one unit of the outside good is chosen. We acknowledge that this is a major 
assumption, and further work investigating approaches such as in Augustin et al. (2015) or Dumont 
et al. (2013) is an interesting area for additional work. The maximum expenditure across all tasks for 
a given individual combines data from both sets of scenarios, thus including those tasks where 
promotions were presented ? dŚŝƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŚĞůƉ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ?Ɛ ƐƵŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŶŐ
expenditure in the presence of promotions. Of course, the increase in expenditure observed in the 
presence of promotions may differ depending on the extent of the promotions presented, and our 
budget assumptions clearly relate only to what was presented in the SP tasks. As such, the model 
may potentially lead to an underestimation of the impact of promotions when more (or stronger) 
promotions than those presented in the tasks for that respondents are considered in a forecast. 
The results for the MDCEV models are split across two tables, with the structural parameters and 
product specific constants shown in Table 6, and the socio-demographic effects in Table 7. In both 
ŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ǁĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚɲƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽǌĞƌŽ ?Ğssentially implying a log transform on consumption, i.e. 
a very strong satiation effect. The product specific constants also generally imply a higher baseline 
utility for a product under promotion than at full price, showing the market impact of promotion. 
The socio-demographic effects are mostly similar to those identified in the Heckman models, 
although subtle differences arise, e.g. for age impacts on Wine B, the impact of the low-skilled term 
for Spirits, and the impact of the Age45+ term for spirits. 
As in the other models, the impacts of region terms were inconsistent in these models. The term 
testing for the impact of the shelf ordering in the choice scenarios was generally insignificant and 
inconsistent in sign across products and segments. These variables were therefore omitted from the 
final models. 
5. Forecast and policy scenario test 
5.1 Forecasting framework 
dŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ? ůŝŬĞůǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽĂůĐŽŚŽůƉŽůŝĐǇ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŝŶĂ
changing market, the Tobit, Heckman and MDCEV models were next used in a forecast framework. 
 For this, the sample observations were re-weighted to achieve a nationally representative 
distribution of population characteristics and consumption level.   
The forecast models are applied to the first record of the SP survey for each respondent in the main 
survey, weighted to reflect population and consumption patterns, remembering that this first record 
reflected the baseline in terms of all alcohol types at their baseline prices without promotions.  
The Tobit forecast follows a procedure described in Carson and Sun (2007), using a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet model. In the Heckman model, an instrumental variable (inverse Mills ratio) is 
calculated and applied in estimation as a correction term, to maintain consistency. In forecasting, 
this term is also used and it generally ensures that the majority of forecasts are non-negative. 
However, there remains a possibility that some negative consumption is predicted (Daly, 2013). In 
the present study, we have observed very few cases of predicted negative consumption. To retain 
consistency, this small number of negative forecasts is retained in the forecast, despite their lack of 
reality. If negative forecasts were suppressed, the overall total would be biased upwards. For the 
MDCEV model, the forecast follows the detailed approach described in Pinjari & Bhat (2011).  
Scenario tests were run to provide a set of bespoke alcohol policy intervention analysis for the 
impact of the price change and promotion compared ƚŽƚŚĞ “ŽŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ? 
- A 10% increase in price to compute the price elasticity for each type of alcohol product (six 
categories) separately;  
- Introducing alcohol multi-buy promotions; 
- Removing a package of alcohol multi-buy promotions. 
 Table 6 MDCEV results (technical parameters) 
 
 
Moderate Hazardous & harmful 
   
Moderate Hazardous & harmful 
 
Final LL 54,789.85 87,159.06 
   
estimate t-ratio estimate t-ratio 
       
į
SUR
GXF
WVS
HFL
ILF
co
n
st
an
ts
) 
wine A -4.555 -41.72 -4.89 -48.02 
  
estimate t-ratio estimate t-ratio 
 
wine A promotion 1 -4.033 -27.3 -4.113 -28.41 
 
Į0 tends to zero tends to zero 
 
wine A promotion 2 -4.116 -24.54 -4.278 -23.7 
 
ı 1.085 92.08 1.243 109.2 
 
wine A promotion 3 -4.003 -23.85 -4.244 -25.41 
Ȗ 
wine A 20.25 21.15 26.41 24.6 
 
wine B -4.907 -23.44 -5.987 -28.14 
wine B 22.47 13.76 23.2 16.44 
 
wine B promotion 1 -4.258 -19.33 -4.837 -21.29 
wine C 18.34 7.341 15.88 9.699 
 
wine B promotion 2 -3.449 -15.19 -4.003 -17.43 
beer A 13.01 18.42 13.47 22.68 
 
wine B promotion 3 -4.079 -17.5 -4.866 -20.81 
beer B 6.224 16.36 4.791 18.03 
 
wine C -7.558 -15.02 -6.803 -18.47 
spirits 57.31 15.93 36.6 22.82 
 
wine C promotion 1 -6.331 -12.02 -5.114 -12.52 
wine A promotion 1 51.39 6.698 43.94 8.031 
 
wine C promotion 2 -5.416 -10.63 -4.439 -10.99 
wine A promotion 2 26.73 6.207 27.86 6.11 
 
wine C promotion 3 -6.499 -11.84 -5.002 -12.04 
wine A promotion 3 35.92 5.375 45.24 5.867 
 
beer A -3.386 -18.3 -4.919 -27.15 
wine B promotion 1 69.08 6.375 49.02 9.038 
 
beer A promotion 1 -3.144 -15.67 -4.129 -21.06 
wine B promotion 2 24.39 7.561 23.61 8.885 
 
beer A promotion 2 -3.086 -14.38 -4.44 -21.34 
wine B promotion 3 60.07 4.988 47.16 6.96 
 
beer A promotion 3 -2.899 -13.51 -4.542 -21.34 
wine C promotion 1 92.47 2.738 84.54 3.405 
 
beer B -4.255 -18.87 -5.449 -23.21 
wine C promotion 2 34.48 3.813 37.14 4.236 
 
beer B promotion 1 -4.883 -18.63 -6.093 -22.17 
wine C promotion 3 88.28 1.853 58.41 3.221 
 
beer B promotion 2 -4.232 -16.09 -5.131 -19.07 
beer A promotion 1 46.73 8.104 36.53 11.01 
 
beer B promotion 3 -4.108 -15.59 -5.254 -18.85 
beer A promotion 2 44.62 5.594 34.21 7.515 
 
spirits -6.233 -28.7 -5.927 -32.1 
beer A promotion 3 26.61 5.973 32.08 6.856 
 
spirits promotion 1 -6.014 -25.83 -5.438 -27.04 
beer B promotion 1 74.28 2.85 45.72 4.63 
 
spirits promotion 2 -5.778 -24.87 -5.293 -26.52 
beer B promotion 2 44.18 3.712 28.2 5.658 
       beer B promotion 3 24.81 4.315 18.77 5.282 
       
spirits promotion 1 241.2 5.756 120.7 10.05 
       
spirits promotion 2 134.5 6.522 77.17 10.2 
        
 Table 7: MDCEV results (socio-demographics) 
 
 
Moderate 
Hazardous & 
harmful 
   
Moderate 
Hazardous & 
harmful 
 
 
estimate 
t-
ratio estimate 
t-
ratio 
   
estimate t-ratio estimate t-ratio 
w
in
e 
A
 
Female 0.2928 4.92 0.4702 8.09 
 
be
er
 
A
 
Female -0.5682 -8.79 -0.5371 -8.69 
Age 18-24 (base 25-44) -0.0815 -0.82 -0.4984 -4.60 
 
Age 18-24 (base 25-44) -0.0413 -0.42 0.3160 3.10 
Age over 45 (base 25-44) -0.1073 -1.62 0.1742 2.90 
 
Age over 45 (base 25-44) -1.0280 -14.73 -0.6883 -10.68 
Household income £40-60k p.a. (base under £40k) -0.2216 -2.51 
   
Household income over £60k p.a.  -0.2584 -2.41 
Household income over £60k p.a. (base under £40k) -0.4754 -4.02 
   
Household income not known  -0.6578 -6.38 
Household income not known -0.3237 -3.70 
   
Low Skilled -0.3356 -3.99 0.3074 3.83 
Low Skilled -0.1801 -2.35 0.2069 2.69 
 
East (base London & SE) -0.5596 -5.23 0.1947 1.89 
East (base London & SE) -0.1967 -2.08 0.3733 3.85 
 
North (base London & SE) -0.1379 -1.58 -0.0023 -0.03 
North (base London & SE) -0.2844 -3.45 0.0918 1.20 
 
Scotland (base London & SE) -0.1579 -1.38 -0.5184 -3.91 
Scotland (base London & SE) -0.3786 -3.51 -0.0253 -0.21 
 
West (base London & SE) -0.0507 -0.58 -0.1391 -1.56 
West (base London & SE) -0.2641 -3.18 -0.0533 -0.63 
 
Higher education -0.2590 -2.96 0.1850 2.23 
2 or more adults in household 0.3958 6.70 -0.0104 -0.18 
 
Low education (GCSE or less) 0.2249 2.46 0.3926 4.63 
Respondent's share of alcohol buying for household 0.0004 1.12 -0.0005 -1.21 
 
Respondent's share of alcohol buying for household 0.0001 0.20 0.0012 3.11 
Promotions on upper shelf -0.1699 -1.42 -0.0371 -0.32 
 
Promotions on upper shelf -0.3197 -3.12 -0.2810 -3.03 
w
in
e 
B 
Female 0.2793 3.89 0.3125 4.48 
 
be
er
 
B 
Female -0.4410 -5.80 0.0692 0.89 
Age 18-24 (base over 25) -0.1932 -1.72 -0.0713 -0.57 
 
Age 18-24 (base 25-44) 0.5897 5.32 0.9532 8.02 
Household income £20-60k p.a. (base under £20 k p.a.) 0.2876 3.51 0.6652 7.40 
 
Age over 45 (base 25-44) -0.7185 -8.55 -1.1060 -12.99 
Household income over £60k p.a. (base under £20k) 0.1695 1.19 1.3450 10.67 
 
Household income £20-60k p.a. (base under £20 k p.a.) 0.4275 4.94 0.5890 6.04 
Household income not known 0.2355 2.07 0.5647 4.67 
 
Household income over £60k p.a. (base under £20k) 0.8680 6.05 0.8686 5.91 
Low Skilled -0.4056 -3.75 -0.0760 -0.69 
 
Household income not known 0.2692 2.20 0.1433 1.02 
East (base London & SE) -0.6849 -5.70 0.1584 1.36 
 
East (base London & SE) -0.0701 -0.52 0.0046 0.04 
North (base London & SE) -0.3233 -3.35 -0.1626 -1.79 
 
North (base London & SE) 0.3389 3.03 -0.5635 -5.56 
Scotland (base London & SE) -0.0021 -0.02 -0.1325 -0.96 
 
Scotland (base London & SE) 0.6593 4.94 -0.1870 -1.24 
West (base London & SE) -0.5047 -4.99 -0.2503 -2.46 
 
West (base London & SE) 0.5760 5.32 -0.2840 -2.58 
2 or more adults in household 0.1085 1.11 0.1024 1.13 
 
Higher education -0.1304 -1.31 0.3605 3.53 
 Low education (GCSE or less) -0.4472 -4.07 -0.4168 -4.17 
 
Low education (GCSE or less) -0.1332 -1.23 0.0554 0.49 
Respondent's share of alcohol buying for household 0.0002 0.44 -0.0006 -1.36 
 
2 or more adults in household 0.1318 1.73 0.1550 1.76 
Promotions on upper shelf -0.1763 -1.75 -0.1112 -1.21 
 
Respondent's share of alcohol buying for household 0.0010 2.31 0.0005 0.97 
w
in
e 
C 
Female -0.1211 -0.93 -0.2848 -2.35 
 
Promotions on upper shelf -0.3086 -2.09 0.2278 1.64 
Age 18-24 (base 25-44) -0.2140 -0.78 0.3668 1.75 
 
sp
ir
its
 
Female 0.2032 3.10 0.2243 3.70 
Age over 45 (base 25-44) 0.1426 0.93 -0.6136 -4.77 
 
Age 18-24 (base 25-44) 0.5143 4.87 0.5363 5.02 
Household income £20-60k p.a. (base under £20 k p.a.) 0.5935 3.26 
   
Age over 45 (base 25-44) -0.0426 -0.56 0.1287 1.98 
Household income over £60k p.a. (base under £20k) 1.2370 4.87 
   
Household income over £20k p.a. 0.3343 5.33 
Household income not known (base under £20k p.a.) 0.7799 3.55 
   
Low Skilled 0.2561 3.14 0.1940 2.32 
Household income under £20k p.a. (base over £20k p.a.) 0.8782 5.63 
 
East (base London & SE) -0.1675 -1.57 0.2798 2.66 
Low skilled -0.5823 -2.46 -0.6736 -3.04 
 
North (base London & SE) -0.0982 -1.09 0.3001 3.72 
East (base London & SE) -0.7123 -2.91 -0.0802 -0.40 
 
Scotland (base London & SE) 0.3586 3.31 0.4073 3.38 
North (base London & SE) -0.0252 -0.15 -0.3669 -2.41 
 
West (base London & SE) -0.1596 -1.73 -0.0501 -0.55 
Scotland (base London & SE) 0.8010 4.13 -1.1110 -4.16 
 
Higher education 0.5082 5.26 0.0243 0.31 
West (base London & SE) -0.7566 -3.67 -0.6473 -3.65 
 
Low education (GCSE or less) 0.3873 3.77 0.0024 0.03 
Higher education 0.8408 3.70 0.3672 2.24 
 
2 or more adults in household -0.1041 -1.64 -0.2968 -4.64 
Low education (GCSE or less) 0.2366 0.96 -0.6838 -3.54 
 
Respondent's share of alcohol buying for household 0.0010 2.62 0.0014 3.75 
2 or more adults in household -0.2573 -1.92 0.0722 0.50 
 
Promotions on upper shelf -0.1206 -1.13 -0.0174 -0.19 
Respondent's share of alcohol buying for household -0.0002 -0.30 
         
Promotions on upper shelf 0.0118 0.06 -0.4518 -2.39 
       
 5.2 Price elasticity 
We use the models to predict the impact of a 10% pricing increase (compared to the baseline 
scenario) on the volume of alcohol units purchased for each alcohol type by level of consumption. 
We then computed the impact on expenditure.  
Table 8 summarises the own-price elasticities for each specific alcohol type, derived from the Tobit, 
Heckman and MDCEV models. The elasticities are calculated using the ratio between the log price 
change and log purchase volume change. It is further assumed that prices for other alcohol types 
would not change. 
Generally, elasticities are relatively consistent between the Tobit and Heckman models, however, 
higher price elasticities, particularly for cheaper alcohol products, are observed in the MDCEV 
models. Across all models as expected, the elasticities for purchasing units are higher (more strongly 
negative3) than for expenditure. Alcohol price increases lead to reductions in the volume of units 
purchased. However, as the amount paid for each unit increases, the impact of price reduction on 
the total expenditure is relatively smaller than the impact on units. Therefore the elasticities for 
purchasing units would be expected to be numerically larger than the elasticity for expenditure.  
Moreover, some of the expenditure elasticities from the Tobit and Heckman models are positive, 
which are not observed in the MDCEV models. Wine A and wine B are at the lower end of price 
(inferior good) within the same type of alcohol and are found relatively inelastic to price changes 
compared to the other types of alcohol (normal good) in this study.  Volland (2012) found that beer 
is an inferior good in Germany and is price inelastic. Gallet and List (1998) found similar results, but 
corresponded to a minority of results (e.g., Nelson, 2003). This may also be attributed to incomplete 
representation of the competition of alcohol types in these models.  
In the MDCEV models, the own-price elasticities on units purchased for less expensive Wine A and 
Beer A products are higher (more negative), because of the better representation of competition in 
these models.  
For most products, we tend to find that the price elasticities for moderate drinkers are higher than 
for hazardous and harmful drinkers (although the differences are less in the Tobit and Heckman 
models). These findings are consistent with findings from others, e.g. Fogerty (2004). However, 
because hazardous and harmful drinkers purchase much higher volumes of alcohol, the absolute 
impact on these groups will be greater compared to less heavy drinkers. 
 
                                                          
3 When a single alcohol type is considered, the expenditure elasticity is exactly 1 more than the units elasticity. 
 Table 8 Own-price elasticities from the models (10% price increase) 
 Units Expenditure 
 Total Moderate H&H Total Moderate H&H 
Tobit models 
Wine A -0.33 -0.37 -0.29 +0.67 +0.63 +0.71 
Wine B -1.76 -1.76 -1.76 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 
Wine C -1.57 -1.57 -1.56 -0.57 -0.57 -0.56 
Beer A -0.61 -0.57 -0.66 +0.39 +0.43 +0.34 
Beer B -1.07 -1.18 -0.87 -0.07 -0.18 +0.13 
Spirits -1.34 -1.52 -1.14 -0.34 -0.53 -0.14 
All wine -0.19 -0.15 -0.24 +0.43 +0.44 +0.41 
All beer -0.58 -0.64 -0.50 +0.38 +0.30 +0.50 
Heckman Models 
Wine A -0.37 -0.45 -0.30 +0.63 +0.55 +0.70 
Wine B -2.00 -2.04 -1.95 -1.00 -1.04 -0.95 
Wine C -1.77 -1.63 -1.95 -0.77 -0.63 -0.95 
Beer A -0.45 -0.32 -0.59 +0.55 +0.68 +0.41 
Beer B -1.05 -1.11 -0.91 -0.05 -0.11 +0.09 
Spirits -1.45 -1.45 -1.47 -0.45 -0.45 -0.47 
All wine -0.47 -0.51 -0.42 +0.19 +0.13 +0.26 
All beer -0.48 -0.40 -0.56 +0.46 +0.46 +0.46 
MDCEV 
Wine A -1.30 -1.41 -1.23 -0.30 -0.41 -0.23 
Wine B -1.60 -1.69 -1.50 -0.60 -0.69 -0.50 
Wine C -2.19 -2.19 -1.78 -1.19 -1.19 -0.78 
Beer A -1.36 -1.48 -1.26 -0.36 -0.48 -0.26 
Beer B -1.51 -1.57 -1.39 -0.51 -0.57 -0.39 
Spirits -1.44 -1.58 -1.33 -0.44 -0.58 -0.33 
All wine -1.30 -1.39 -1.22 -0.33 -0.43 -0.25 
All beer -1.35 -1.45 -1.26 -0.37 -0.47 -0.28 
 
Collis et al. (2010) report the following elasticities from a review of existing UK alcohol studies: 
x Beer, median = -0.40, mean = -0.56  
x Wine, median = -0.86, mean = -0.90  
x Spirits, median = -0.72, mean = -0.75 
It is difficult to make direct comparisons with the model outputs from this study, as it is not clear to 
what extent these published values reflect units purchased or expenditure (Collis et al. (2010) refer 
to the impact of price on alcohol consumption more generally4). Furthermore, in their summary they 
do not state to what extent these reflect on-trade or off-trade purchases (or both). However, we 
note generally that the mean values reported by Collis et al. (2010) fall between the units and 
expenditure elasticities from the MDCEV models developed in this study.  
We also note that, for all categories in the MDCEV model and some categories for Tobit and 
Heckman, the increase in cost not only leads to reduced consumption (units) but also reduced 
expenditure. Suppose price changes by p% and consequently purchasing (units) changes by -q%.  The 
price elasticity of purchasing is then approximately -q/p.  However, expenditure changes by 
                                                          
4 The linkage between purchasing and consumption is not well reported in the literature. Purshouse et al. (2010) in their 
work estimating the effect of alcohol pricing policies equated purchasing and consumption. In an earlier paper this 
assumption was tested by comparing beverage preferences between subgroups in each survey. This comparison showed a 
good match overall, although they found that older females purchased a greater proportion of beer and spirits (in the EFS) 
than they consumed (measured in the GLF), probably because they were purchasing for the household, rather than only for 
themselves (Meier et al., 2009).   
 approximately (p-q)%, so the price elasticity of expenditure is 1-q/p, i.e. 1 more than the elasticity of 
purchasing.  This is clearly visible in Table 8 for all individual products, across models. Clearly, the 
situation is different when looking at changing the price on more than one product at the same time 
(final two rows for each model in Table 8), as a fixed p across products gives us different values of q 
for the different products, making the total q some intermediate value. 
There is also no behavioural reason why q/p should be more or less than 1.  Particularly in a market 
with a lot of competition, consumers are prone to switching easily. As a result, expenditure elasticity 
could be positive or negative. If q/p was less than 1, a producer could simply increases prices to 
generate more revenue for less product. The MDCEV model is more elastic (bigger q) so we more 
often get negative expenditure elasticity. 
In fact, all elasticities we have seen published in literature are negative, although unfortunately it is 
not always clear whether what are reported are in units or expenditure (e.g. Collis et al, 2010). It is 
clearly possible that an increase in alcohol prices will lead respondents to reduce their consumption 
so much that they in fact spend less money. This is what we see in the MDCEV model results  W which 
tend to be more negative in terms of own-price elasticities for units (than the corresponding Tobit 
and Heckman ones), particularly for cheaper alternatives (we note that it is the own-price elasticities 
that are published here and not the elasticity for total expenditure). The reverse clearly also applies 
where, with reduced prices, respondents not only buy more alcohol for the same amount of money, 
ďƵƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƐƉĞŶĚŵŽƌĞŵŽŶĞǇ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŝƚŝƐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐƚŽĞǆƉĞĐƚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐƚŽ “ƐƚŽĐŬƵƉ ?ŽŶ
alcohol when it is cheap, and to not spend much on it when it is expensive. The situation may of 
course be different if the change in price is a long term change rather than a short term fluctuation.  
5.3 Introducing promotions 
In our example looking at the impact of introducing a promotion, we assume that the prices of all 
other alcohol products are equal to the non-discounted prices, and that non-promotion items are 
also available. For example for the tests with promotions on Wine A products, these same products 
are also available at non-discounted prices. The Tobit and Heckman models do not differentiate the 
purchase between promotion and non-promotion items, so we computed the ratio of expenditure 
between promotion and non-promotion items in the choice exercises where both were present.  
Based on the findings on expenditure from the survey, an average price assuming that 86 percent of 
the expenditure came from the promotion items and 14 percent from non-promotion items was 
calculated and then used when computing expenditure from these models. In the MDCEV models, 
the expenditure calculation accurately reflects the predicted purchase pattern predicted in the 
model, differentiating between promotion and non-promotion items. 
tĞƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƐďŽƚŚŽŶƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůĐŽŚŽůƚǇƉĞ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨĂ ‘ ?ĨŽƌ ? ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽŶ
the purchasing of Wine A products), the alcohŽůĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨĂ ‘ ?ĨŽƌ ? ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽŶ
Wine A products on all wine products) and across all alcohol products. For spirits, the former two are 
obviously equal to each other. In the Tobit and Heckman models, the impacts across categories and 
across all alcohol products are obtained by summing the impacts across the different models. They 
are calculated directly from the MDCEV models.  
The reported figures reflect both the impact of the price reduction (measured through the price 
term) and the psychological impact of the promotion itself (measured as a constant in the model) 
 with results shown as a proportional change on demand, i.e. the change in demand divided by the 
demand from the baseline scenario. The results shown in Table 9 look at the overall market, i.e. after 
combining the different categories of drinkers. 
For the Tobit models, in general, we see that the introduction of a promotion always leads to a 
predicted increase in the purchasing of alcohol units for that product. For example, with the 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ Ă  ‘ ? ĨŽƌ  ? ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽŶtŝŶĞ  ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ? ƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůƐ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂ  ? ? ? ? ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ  ? ? ?
percent increase) in the units of Wine A products purchased overall compared to the baseline 
situation with no promotions. This leads to a 35 percent increase in expenditure on Wine A products 
overall  W the proportional increase in expenditure is less than the increase in units purchased 
because some of the purchases are made at a reduced price (because of the promotion). Again we 
emphasise that the expenditure calculations from the Tobit models are imprecise, because the 
model does not explicitly predict the proportion of the market that would purchase promotions.  
The relative impact on expenditure for the alcohol category, e.g. wine, is much smaller  W because of 
cross-switching effects. For example, with a promotion on Wine A products, people who tend to 
purchase Wine B products may purchase fewer of these and instead purchase Wine A products, so 
we see an increase in Wine A products, but the increase across all wine purchases is not as large. So, 
ǁĞƐĞĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ  ‘ ?ĨŽƌ ? ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽŶtŝŶĞ ůĞĂĚƐƚŽĂ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŝŶƚŚĞƉƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐŽĨ
units of wine products overall, but a 17 percent reduction in expenditure on wine products overall. 
The impact across all alcohol purchases is still smaller  W ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ ?ĨŽƌ ? ?tŝŶĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶůĞĂĚƐ
to a 15 percent increase in purchasing units of all alcohol but an 8 percent reduction in expenditure. 
Again, we note concerns regarding the reliability of the expenditure calculations from the Tobit 
models. 
We observe much higher predicted increases for promotions introduced in the Wine C (expensive 
wine) market, particularly with regard to increases in Wine C units purchased relative to the baseline 
scenario (a 954 percent increase). But we note that Wine C purchases account for only around 2 
percent of units in the baseline scenario. Therefore, with promotions that make Wine C nearly as 
attractive as Wine B (around 16 percent of the market in the baseline scenario), we see a large 
percentage change, but for a small market, so the overall impact is not large. In fact the impact on 
total wine units and all alcohol units is negligible (due to cross-trading), although the impact on total 
wine expenditure is larger (because some respondents will be trading up to purchase more 
expensive wine). 
In general, the impacts in the Heckman models are higher than those predicted from the Tobit 
models, except for Spirits (which are quite similar), which is consistent with the higher price 
elasticities for the Heckman models. However, we note that many of the price terms were not as 
significant in the Heckman models, which is likely a result of having to estimate models for the two 
separate processes (selection and quantity). So, whilst having separate functions is desirable 
theoretically, in practice more data would be needed to provide more reliable estimates in the 
Heckman models.  
Consistent with the price elasticity impacts, we find that the direct impacts (for example the impact 
of a promotion on a Wine A product on Wine A purchases) measured from the MDCEV models are 
generally higher than those measured from the Tobit and Heckman models, particularly for wine 
 products, but not for beer and spirits. This may be because the MDCEV models better represent the 
impacts of competition, but IID assumptions are also a concern (see earlier discussion). 
However, the benefit of the MDCEV models is that they better reflect the impacts of pricing and 
promotions on other products and on total alcohol purchased. So, from the promotion impacts of 
the MDCEV model we see the following trends: 
x The introduction of a promotion always leads to increased purchasing of alcohol for that 
specific type of product (both in terms of units purchased and expenditure). 
x This increase is partly compensated by a reduction in purchasing of units for other types of 
alcohol, which are measured directly in the model.  
o ^Ž ? ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ  ‘ ? ĨŽƌ  ? ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝ ŶŽŶŵĞĚŝƵŵ-priced wine 
(Wine B-type products) leads to a 630 percent increase in purchasing of Wine B 
units, but a smaller increase (72 percent) in all wine products, because of the 
likelihood of switching between wine products. 
x Moreover, the MDCEV models predict the impact on all alcohol purchases, taking account of 
cross-product trading.  
o ^Ž ?ƚŚĞ ‘ ?ĨŽƌ ? ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽŶtŝŶĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐǁŝůůůĞĂĚ ƚŽĂ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶ
all alcohol units, because of consumer trade-offs between beer and spirits and wine, 
and a 23 percent increase in expenditure across all alcohol products.  
More generally, in the MDCEV models applying individual promotions on less expensive wine and 
less expensive beer lead to increased purchasing of alcohol units, while promotions on expensive 
wine and beer lead to more purchases of these items at the expense of cheaper counterparts and 
therefore a smaller increase (or even a small reduction) in total units purchased. For spirits, 
promotions lead to increased purchases of units, because of the higher number of units per bottle.  
5.4 Removing a package of promotions 
The real-world market often has number of different competing promotions in force at the same 
time. Another scenario test ǁĂƐ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ ƚŽ ƋƵĂŶƚŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽĨ ƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ ? ŽĨ
promotions. A quick review of UK supermarket websites5 indicated that the most prevalent offers 
were in the form of x for £y, and that many of the discounts were in the order of 25 W50 percent. In 
order to test a package that reflected the observed magnitude of discounts more generally, we did a 
ƚĞƐƚǁŝƚŚĂďĂƐĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ‘ ?ĨŽƌ ? ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂůůǁŝŶĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?tŝŶĞ ?
tŝŶĞĂŶĚtŝŶĞ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ ? ĨŽƌ  ? ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌďĞer and premium beer, and then looked at the 
impact of removing both promotions at the same time. No promotion for spirits was included in the 
test, as these were less common. We have assumed that non-promotion items are also available in 
the test at their non-promotion (baseline) price. 
In the Tobit and Heckman models, the impacts across categories and across all alcohol products are 
obtained by summing the impacts across the different models. They are calculated directly from the 
MDCEV models. The resulting impacts from each model are summarised in Table 10 below. We again 
present the aggregate results across both consumption segments. We caution that these tests may 
overstate the impact of promotions, because it is not known to what extent all promotions would be 
presented simultaneously in the market place, and also as our models are not estimated on data 
that looks at both including and removing promotions. 
                                                          
5 The review was undertaken using the MySupermarket website: http://www.mysupermarket.co.uk/ (Accessed on 4 June 
2013) 
  
Table 9: Impact of introducing promotions 
 Impact on alcohol type Impact on alcohol category Impact on all alcohol purchases 
 Units Expenditure Units Expenditure Units Expenditure 
Tobit       
Wine A  W 3 for 2 0.88 0.35 0.35 -0.17 0.15 -0.08 
Wine B  W 3 for 2 4.55 2.97 0.83 0.81 0.36 0.37 
Wine C  W 3 for 2 9.54 6.55 -0.04 0.22 -0.02 0.10 
Beer A  W 8 for 6 1.20 0.72 0.82 0.20 0.08 -0.03 
Beer B  W 8 for 6 2.00 1.35 0.17 0.39 -0.09 0.03 
Spirits  W 2 for 90% 3.58 3.19 3.58 3.19 1.09 0.68 
Heckman    
Wine A  W 3 for 2 1.31 0.65 0.71 0.07 0.34 0.04 
Wine B  W 3 for 2 5.55 3.69 1.04 1.06 0.50 0.54 
Wine C  W 3 for 2 17.01 11.90 0.24 0.59 0.11 0.31 
Beer A  W 8 for 6 2.80 1.99 2.10 0.94 0.31 0.16 
Beer B  W 8 for 6 6.69 5.04 1.06 1.83 0.13 0.39 
Spirits  W 2 for 90% 3.85 4.61 3.85 4.61 1.25 1.12 
MDCEV      
Wine A  W 3 for 2 2.59 1.60 2.10 1.04 0.83 0.32 
Wine B  W 3 for 2 6.30 4.06 0.72 0.79 0.20 0.23 
Wine C  W 3 for 2 35.4 23.5 0.16 0.39 -0.01 0.11 
Beer A  W 8 for 6 2.92 2.12 2.46 1.37 0.29 0.17 
Beer B  W 8 for 6 4.03 2.97 0.44 0.80 -0.02 0.09 
Spirits  W 2 for 90% 2.02 1.79 2.02 1.79 0.44 0.23 
 
With the removal of the wine and beer promotions, the Tobit and Heckman models predict a 
decrease in purchasing of Wine B and Wine C products, but an increase in Wine A products. The 
result for Wine A products is a consequence of the strong cross-price and cross-promotion terms for 
Wine B and Wine C products in that model. This may also relate to the inelastic price elasticity found 
in that the wine A product. Moreover, because of the relatively large size of the Wine A market, the 
Tobit models predict an overall increase in units and expenditure for all wine products and for all 
alcohol products. We judge this to be a structural problem with the Tobit models, as each has been 
estimated with a relatively small amount of data, and cross-effects are not well estimated. Although 
the Heckman models also predict an increase in Wine A units, they predict a decrease in all wine and 
all alcohol products with the removal of the promotions. The impacts predicted on Wine B, beer and 
spirits look more reasonable; although the impact of the increased purchasing of spirits is different 
between the two models. The MDCEV models predict reductions in wine markets (the smallest 
reduction in Wine A, followed by Wine B and Wine C) and beer markets, and an increase in 
purchasing of spirits. Overall, removing this specific package of promotions leads to a predicted 48 
percent reduction in purchasing of alcohol units and a 37 percent reduction in expenditure. All 
models predict an increase in the consumption of spirits if promotions on wine and beer are 
removed.  
 Table 10 Impacts of removing a package of promotions (3 for 2 on wine and 8 for 6 on beer) 
 Impact on alcohol type Impact on alcohol 
category 
Impact on all alcohol 
purchases 
 Units Expenditure Units Expenditure Units Expenditure 
Tobit      
Wine A 2.58 4.00 
0.32 0.29 
0.20 0.19 
Wine B -0.26 0.03 
Wine C -0.73 -0.62 
Beer A -0.34 -0.16 
-0.37 -0.23 Beer B -0.46 -0.31 
Spirits 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 
Heckman      
Wine A  1.37 2.31 
-0.27 -0.36 
-0.28 -0.36 
Wine B  -0.54 -0.36 
Wine C  -0.93 -0.90 
Beer A  -0.59 -0.48 
-0.65 -0.62 Beer B  -0.78 -0.72 
Spirits  0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
MDCEV      
Wine A  -0.58 -0.42 
-0.63 -0.53 
-0.48 -0.37 
Wine B  -0.75 -0.64 
Wine C  -0.93 -0.89 
Beer A  -0.61 -0.44 
-0.62 -0.47 Beer B  -0.67 -0.52 
Spirits  2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The aim of this study was to measure the impact of multi-buy promotions on ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?off-trade 
alcohol purchasing. Our analysis complements the existing evidence by deploying a stated 
preference approach to measure and to explain consumers ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƉƌŝĐĞĂŶĚŵƵůƚŝ-
buy promotions which might not be easily observed in the real market. A range of econometric 
ŵŽĚĞůƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ? ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝmpact of multi-buy 
promotion. The Tobit and Heckman models established a benchmark to the existing alcohol pricing 
studies, before an advanced MDCEV model was developed which can better replicate the 
competition of the multi-buy promotions among different types of alcohols and substitution of the 
purchase with presence of different offers.  
The MDCEV models allow for better representation of the competition between alcohol products, 
which is not measured as well in the single-product regression models, as well as situations where 
multiple options are chosen  W in around 42 percent of tasks, respondents made purchase choices 
that included more than one alcohol type within a specific choice scenario. Furthermore, the MDCEV 
models also explicitly consider the impact of an available maximum budget for purchases, so that 
competition between products is again better represented. The MDCEV models additionally 
represent the effect of satiation, i.e. that the marginal utility of additional purchases declines as 
more of a given product is purchased. Furthermore, the MDCEV models use the data more 
efficiently, because all observations (within a segment) contribute to the estimation of the model 
parameters. 
For this study we tested multinomial model structures, where promotion and non-promotion items 
are represented as separate alternatives, equally competitive with each other and other types of 
ĂůĐŽŚŽů ? /Ŷ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ǁĞ ĨŝŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŽŵĞ ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ĂƌĞŵŽƌĞ  ‘ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ĂƌĞ
closer substitutes than others (not IID). We hypothesise that this is probably true for promotion and 
 non-promotion options of a specific type of alcohol, where we would expect higher cross-elasticities, 
for example between a Wine A non-promotion product and a Wine A promotion product. 
Correlation may also exist between the different categories of a given alcohol type, e.g. wine. The 
introduction of such correlation would therefore give a better representation of the stated 
behaviour, but while technically feasible (cf. Pinjari and Bhat, 2010; Pinjari, 2011; Bhat et al., 2013), 
it was beyond the scope of the present study. With the inclusion of a nesting structure (if justified by 
the data), the effect of the introduction of a new alternative, i.e. a promotion alternative in this 
study, is reduced. As a result, it is possible that our MDCEV models overstate the impact of 
introducing promotions. On the other hand, the Tobit and Heckman models are likely to 
underestimate the impact of promotions, because of the limited representation of competition in 
these models. For these reasons we recommend that the results from the MDCEV models be treated 
as maximum estimates of the impacts of promotions on alcohol purchasing. 
The results from the stated preference data appear to be credible, and the resulting price elasticities 
seem to be, generally, of the same order of magnitude as other reported values, although it is 
difficult to make direct comparisons because of differences in study scope (on-trade vs. off-trade) 
and lack of clarity of output measures (units, monetary expenditure, consumption, etc.) in other 
studies.  However, the models may overestimate the impact of multi-buy promotions for a number 
of reasons. First, the results are based on stated preference data, rather than observed purchases, 
where people may state larger responses to price changes. Second, because of the technical 
properties of the MDCEV model, specifically assumptions about cross-elasticities between products 
(as a result of the IID property of the models), it is likely to lead to overestimates of the impacts of 
promotions. The Tobit and Heckman models may be less likely to lead to overestimates of impacts, 
as a result of their model structure, but the predicted impacts from these models are still subject to 
the points raised above. Third, single-product promotion tests are likely to overestimate the impacts 
of these promotions on individual products, because they do not reflect real-world market 
conditions which may include a number of different competing promotions at the same time.  
Moreover, the package tests may also overstate the impact of promotions because it is not known to 
what extent all promotions would be presented simultaneously in the market place. 
Mindful of the limitations of any empirical study, our findings represent an important contribution to 
the impact of multi-buy promotion on alcohol promotion as well as to policy. In terms of the former, 
the study adds to the evidence of evaluation of the multi-buy promotions on the consumers 
purchase behaviour, given the difficulty of evaluating alcohol policy interventions at a population 
level. The most frequent price interventions in the alcohol market has been that of imposing excise 
duties on alcohol beverages. However, there appear to be limits in the form of political and public 
acceptability regarding further extension of these measures. There is a reason to believe that 
countries may be seeking other, less contentious pricing policies  W a characteristic that would 
arguably be met by the restriction of quantity discounts.  
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